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Abstract 
The IAEA nuclear material safeguards system consists 
basically of two different parts. One is the data veri- 
fication scheme: the operators of nuclear plants report 
all relevant data on nuclear material processed in the 
plant to the safeguards authority. These data are then 
verified by the safeguards authority with independent 
measurements. The other part is the material account- 
ability scheme: in case there are no significant differ- 
ences between the operator's and the safeguards author- 
ity's data, all of the operator's data are taken for the 
nuclear material balance establishment. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the overall 
probability of detection of this system in case someone 
tries to divert material. This evaluation takes into 
account the different diversion strategies available. It 
is complicated because the two decision functions on 
which the evaluation is based--the difference between 
operator's and inspector's data and the difference be- 
tween book and physical inventory--are stochastically 
dependent. Exact formulas are derived and applied to a 
realistic case; it is shown that with a good approxima- 
tion, one may neglect the correlation and thus, use 
simplified formulas. 
Material Accountability and Its Verification: 
A Special Example of Multivariate Statistical Inference 
Rudolf Avenhaus and Nebojsa Nakicenovic 
1. Introduction 
On March 5, 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons [l] was enforced after having been verified by 
forty-three nations. This treaty is aimed at preventing the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons; it was conceived by Great 
Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S,R., and was signed on July 
1, 1968. The exceptions are those nations which possessed 
nuclear weapons prior to the signing of the treaty. In order 
to achieve non-proliferation , the treaty has established 
international safeguards which guarantee that a diversion of 
significant amounts of nuclear material from the peaceful 
nuclear fuel cycle will be detected early. These safeguards 
are carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in Vienna, Austria. 
At the time of the Treaty's conception there existed, at 
least in the U.S.A., 25 years of experience of handling and 
controlling nuclear material; it quickly became clear, however, 
that an international control of national industries would 
cause completely new problems. For this reason, various nations 
began intense research and development activities with the 
purpose of establishing a practicable and acceptable inter- 
national safeguards system (see, e.g. [2,3,41). 
A significant step was made when the Safeguards Committee 
was able to establish a model agreement for an international 
Safeguards System [5]; this was conceived as a model for the 
Safeguards Treaties between the IAEA and those nations which 
signed the treaty. The Safeguards Committee was established 
by the Board of Governors at the IAEA, and represented more 
than forty nations. The agreement was negotiated from July 
1970 to February 1971. 
According to this model agreement, material accountability 
was established as the fundamental safeguards measure, with 
containment and surveillance as complementary measures. In 
this context, material accountability means the comparison 
between the book inventory, i.e. the added material inputs and 
outputs of a material balance area during the inventory period, 
and the physical inventory at the end of an inventory period. 
The reason for this structure of the Safeguards System was the 
fact that such a system can be formalized better and is more 
objective than any other possible system; this was a necessary 
condition for international acceptability. 
Furthermore, in the IAEA Model Agreement, the rules were 
established according to the way in which nuclear material 
safeguards must be carried out: the operator of a nuclear 
plant collects all source data which are necessary for the 
material balance establishment. The safeguards authority 
verifies these data with the help of independent measurements 
on a random sampling basis. If there exist no significant 
differences between the operator's and the inspector's data, 
then the safeguards authority assumes all of the operator's 
data to be correct and establishes the material balance with 
the help of these data. If significant differences exist 
either in the data comparison or in the material balance, then 
a "second action level" is induced to clarify whether or not 
they indicate a diversion of nuclear material. 
Due to the fact that only declared material is subject 
to international safeguards ("misuse" of nuclear plants is not 
the subject of IAEA safeguards), the nuclear plant operator 
who wants to divert nuclear material has two different pos- 
sibilities or strategies: 
1) Either he diverts nuclear material without 
falsifying any data which he reports to the 
safeguards authority and expects that the 
measurement uncertainties of the material 
balance to cover the diversion; or 
2) he falsifies the data to be reported and 
diverts the corresponding amount of material 
in such a way that the material balance is 
correct and expects that either the measurement 
uncertainties or the random sampling procedure 
to cover the diversion. 
Clearly, a combination of both strategies is also 
possible. 
The evaluation scheme of the safeguards authority is 
based on two "decision functions": (1) the difference between 
the book and physical inventory MUF ("Material Unaccounted For"), 
and (2) the difference D between the operator's and inspection 
team's data. These decision functions are subject to 
significance tests of the following form: If the realized 
values of MUF resp. D are smaller than given significance 
thresholds sl resp. s2, then it is stated that the operator 
behaved legally. If, on the contrary, at least one of 
these quantities is larger than the significance threshold, 
then the second action level is induced. 
A measure for the efficiency of this procedure is 
the overall probability of detection for a given amount 
M of material to be diverted. The safeguards authority has 
to assume that the operator who intends to divert the amount 
M of material will do it in the most efficient way (from 
his point of view) and will choose that strategy which 
minimizes the probability of detection. On the contrary, 
the safeguards authority chooses that inspection strat- 
egy which maximizes the probability of detection, mini- 
mized by the operator. We call this the guaranteed 
probability of detection as it represents a lower limit 
of the probability of detection. These considerations have 
been discussed in an illuminating way by W. ~afele [ 6 ] .  
The determination of the overall probability of 
detection is complicated because the two decision 
functions MUF and D are stochastically dependent: The 
operator's data are used in both cases. The purpose of 
this paper is to show that in practical cases, the overall 
guaranteed probability of detection can be easily deter- 
mined with simplified formulas as a good approximation. 
In order to achieve this we will first develop the theory 
of the material balance establishment as well as the theory of 
data verification. Thereafter, we will determine the overall 
probability of detection and study its properties: we can 
show that the probability of detection is practically 
independent of the correlation between the two decision 
functions MUF and D l  if the correlation is smaller than zero. 
Furthermore, it will be shown that under general assumptions 
the correlation is, in fact, smaller than zero. 
The theoretical results obtained are illustrated by 
a realistic example (an irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessing 
plant) which was a subject of contract research between the 
IAEA and among others the authors of this paper [ 7 ] .  
2. Theoretical Considerations 
2.1 The Material Balance Concept 
Let us consider a "material balance area" which contains 
at a given time to, some material into which material enters, 
and from which material goes out during a given interval of 
time (to, tl) . 
The material contained in the material balance area at 
time to is called the physical inventory I . The algebraic 
- 
sum of the amounts of material which enter and leave the mate- 
rial balance area in the interval of time (tortl) is called 
the throughput D. The physical inventory at to plus the 
throughput in (t ,tl) give the book inventory B at t i.e. 
0 1' 
the amount of material which should be contained in the mate- 
rial balance area at t 1 : 
The amount of material actually contained in the material bal- 
ance area at tl is the physical inventory I1. 
If all material contained in and passing through the 
material balance area is carefully accounted for, and if no 
material has been diverted, then the difference between the 
book inventory B at tl and the physical inventory I1 should 
be zero. This difference is called "Material Unaccounted For": 
MUF = B - I1 ' 
Thus, we have the problem of finding out whether the nonzero 
difference is caused by measurement errors, or by the diversion 
of material. 
In order to solve this problem, a significance test must 
be performed where the null hypothesis is given by the state- 
ment: the expectation value of MUF is zero, 
and where the alternative hypothesis is given by the statement: 
the expectation value of MUF is M > 0, 1 
The significance test is determined by the significance 
threshold sl: if the realized value of MUF is smaller than 
or equal to sl, then the inspector will state "Ho is correct"; 
but if MUF is larger than sl, he will state "H1 is correct" 
(which does not immediately mean that a diversion of material 
is stated) : 
MUF - < sl: Ho is true , 
MUF > sl: H1 is true . 
This procedure may cause two kinds of false statements: 
i) the inspector states " H ~  is true", when in fact Ho 
is true; 
ii) the inspector states "Ho is true", when in fact H1 
is true. 
The probabilities of committing these errors are called a 1 
and B1: 
5: = prob IMUF > s ~ / H ~ }  , (2-5a) 
B1: = prob {MUF 5 s1/H1} . (2-5b) 
It is assumed that it will be clarified at a "second action 
level" whether or not the "alarm" was justified at MUF > s 1 ' 
Here, a1 is called false alarm probability, whereas 1 - Bl 
is called probability of detection. 
Because of the random measurement errors, the quantities 
I0 ' D, I1 and, therefore, MUF are random variables. Let 
a a2 and oI: be the variances of these random variables. 10' D' 
Then the variance of MUF is given by 
var (MUF) = a 2 2 2 + aD + aI1 =: a 2 I0 
independent of whether or not a diversion MUF would 
take place. If the random variables Io, OD and are 
normally distributed, then MUF is also normally distributed 
and one obtains from (2-5) 
where 6 is the Gaussian distribution function: 
$(XI = - I tL exp dt . 4% 
If one eliminates the significance threshold sl in (2-7b), 
with the help of (2-7a), one obtains 
MUF 'l-al 
where U is the inverse of the Gaussian distribution function. 
Up to now we have considered one inventory period. The 
treatment of a sequence of inventory periods poses special 
problems because of the question of how to choose the starting 
inventory: If at the end of an inventory period there are 
no significant differences between book and ending physical 
inventories, one can take one of these inventories or a linear 
combination of both as the starting inventory for the next 
period (see, e. g. [ 8 I , [ 9  1 ) . However, since the vari- 
ance of the physical inventory is much smaller than the var- 
iance of the throughput, as in the example analyzed in the next 
chapters, we will take the ending physical inventory as 
the starting inventory for the next period. Thus, the 
correlation between different inventory periods may be ne- 
glected. If amounts M and M2 are diverted in two periods, 1 
the total probability of detection is simply given by 
L 1 - B = 1 - @ (U1-n - -  ) @ (ul-n - -  0 L ,  1 MUF 1 ul-l~ F
In the following, we will consider only one inventory period. 
2.2 Data Verification 
As described in the introduction, the safeguards 
system is constructed in such a way that the plant 
operator performs all measurements necessary for the estab- 
lishment of the material balance; he then reports the 
measurement data to the inspector, who in turn verifies these 
data with the help of independent measurements. Among the 
many possibilities for the comparison of the operator's and 
the inspector's data, the use of the so-called D-statistics 
(see [10,11]) has proven most successful. Therefore, we 
will also use it here. In the following, we will describe 
the D-statistics with the help of a simplified model; the ap- 
plication to a realistic case will be given in the next chap- 
ter. 
Let us assume that there are R classes of material, and 
that in the inventory period under consideration the ith 
class (i = 1, ..., R) consists of Ni batches. Let Xij, 
j = l...N i = 1, ..., R, be the measurement result for the i ' 
material content of the jth batch of the ith class reported 
by the operator. Let us furthermore assume that the inspec- 
tor verifies n measurements in the ith class with the help i 
of independent measurements, and that his results are Yij, 
j = l...n i = 1, ..., R. The variances of the random (r) i ' 
and systematic (s) errors of the operator's (0) and inspec- 
- 
2 tor's (I) measurements are uor, u 2 2 0s' '~r and oI: and are 
assumed to be known,where the errors themselves are assumed 
to be normally distributed. 
In order to check whether or not the data of the oper- 
ator are correct, the inspector forms the D-statisticwhich 
is defined by 
It should be noted that this definition specifies that the 
inspector verifies only data from those batches reported by 
the operator which he has measured himself. The reason for 
this is that by means of this procedure, the influence of the 
variation of the true material contents of the batches within 
a class is eliminated. 
Under the null hypothesis, i.e. under the assumption 
that no data reported by the operator are falsified, the ex- 
pectation value and the variance of D are given by the fol- 
lowing expressions: 
Under the alternative hypothesis H1, i.e. under the assump- 
- 
tion that ri of the Ni batches of the ith class are falsified 
by the amount pi,i = 1, . . .aI one obtains 
R 2 
var (D/H ) = : o  2 = i IiJi2 (F + Osi + pi 2 1 i=l 
According to this scheme, the maximum amount of material 
which can be diverted is given by ri = Nit i = 1, ..., R: 
For the diversion without data falsification as described in 
the foregoing section such an upper limit does not exist. 
If the measurement of one batch does not consist of a 
single measurement, but of several (e.g. weight and con- 
centration determination), u * r is not the amount directly 
falsified. An example for this is given in the next section. 
Let s be the significance threshold of the inspector's 2 
test. Then we have as in (2-5) 
a2 : = prob {D > s2/Ho} (2-lla) 
B2: = prob {D - < s2/H11 . (2-llb) 
If we assume that D/Ho and D/H1 are approximately normally 
distributed (see [Ill) , then we obtain (corresponding to 
(2-8)) the following expression for the probability of de- 
tection: 
We will not go into the details of the question of how the 
inspector chooses the ui, and how the operator chooses the 
r as this has been analyzed elsewhere (see [ll] ) . i' 
Here, only the results of an approximation procedure will be 
given. Let the inspector's effort for the measurement of one 
batch in the ith class be Ei, and let the total effort avail- 
able be C. Then a game theoretical treatment gives the fol- 
lowing optimal values: 
j J J J  
2.3 Total Probability of Detection 
As a measure for the efficiency of the entire test pro- 
cedure described above--data verification and material-balance 
establishment with the help of the operator's data--we define 
the total probability of detection 1 - 8 :  
1 - 8: = 1 - prob{D 2 s2 A M U F  < sl/H1) , (2-14a) 
where H means 
In the same sense we define the total false alarm probability 
a by 
1 - a: = prob{D 5 s2 M U F  5 s ~ / H ~ }  , 
where Ho means 
As the operator's data are used both for the data verification 
procedure and for the material balance establishment, 
the random variables D and M U F  are stochastically dependent, 
and one obtains 
t; - 2 t 1 t 2 p  + t 
. ex, I- - 9 a 
where 
cov (DIMUF) 
P :  = - uD/H1 uMUF 
i s  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t .  
For  p = 0,  one  o b t a i n s  from (2-16) 
Eq. (2-17a) i s  w e l l  known i n  t h e  a r e a  of m u l t i v a r i a t e  s t a t i s -  
t i c a l  i n f e r e n c e .  A d i s c u s s i o n  of t h i s  e q u a t i o n  i s  g i v e n  i n  
t h e  Annex. I n  F i g u r e s  1  and 2 ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  numer ica l  c a l c u -  
l a t i o n s  a r e  p r e s e n t e d :  F i g u r e  1  shows f o r  a  = a 2 ,  t h e  depen- 1  
dence of a l  f rom P ,  w i t h  a  a s  pa ramete r ;  F i g u r e  2 shows t h e  
dependence of a l  from a 2 ,  w i t h  p a s  p a r a m e t e r ,  and f o r  f i x e d  
a  = 0.005. The main r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  f o r  p < 0  (which i s  t h e  
c a s e  i n  t h e  example g i v e n  i n  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r )  Eq. (2-16a) 
can b e  w e l l  approximated  by Eq. (2 -17a) .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  a c h i e v e  a s  h i g h  an e f f i c i e n c y  of  t h e  s a f e g u a r d s  
p r o c e d u r e s  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  i n  o t h e r  words,  t o  a c h i e v e  a s  h i g h  a  
t o t a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  d e t e c t i o n  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e  i n s p e c t o r  w i l l  
use  t h o s e  v a l u e s  f o r  a l  and a 2  which maximize 1  - B .  For  ob- 
v i o u s  r e a s o n s ,  however, he canno t  u s e  v a l u e s  which a r e  t o o  
h igh .  T h e r e f o r e ,  w e  assume t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an a g r e e d  v a l u e  o f  
t h e  t o t a l  f a l s e  a l a r m  p r o b a b i l i t y  a ,  and t h a t  t h e  i n s p e c t o r  
can choose o n l y  t h o s e  v a l u e s  of  a l  and a 2  which s a t i s f y  t h e  
boundary c o n d i t i o n  ( 2 -  1 6 a )  . 
On the other hand, as the inspector does not know the 
values of M1 and M2 chosen by the opsrator, and as the in- 
spector wants to optimize his system for a given value of a 
total amount M = M + M2 assumed to be diverted, he must 1 
take into account the best strategy from the operator's 
point of view; i.e. that choice of M1 and M2 which minimizes 
1 - B. 
Therefore, the optimum strategy (al*,a2*;a) of the in- 
spector is defined as the result of the following optimiza- 
tion problem: 
max min (1 - 6) = :1 - B** . (2-18) 
a1 ,a2: M1 ,M2: 
subject to eq. M +M =M 
(2-16a) for 1 2  
given value of a 
1 - B** is called the total guaranteed probability of detec- 
tion. 
It is clear that the optimization problem defined above 
cannot be carried out analytically. In addition, it is too 
complicated for practical purposes. Therefore, one might 
want to replace it with p = 0. As can be seen from Figures 1 
and 2, at least the false alarm equation (2-16a) can be 
suitably replaced by the approximate equation (2-17a). It is 
the question of whether or not this approximation also holds 
for the probability of detection. In order to answer this 
question, a realistic example will be analyzed in the next 
chapter. It may be stated at this point that one can, in fact, 
approximate the probability of detection given by (2-16b) and 
by the simplified formula (2-17b). Furthermore, for practical 
purposes one might want to put 
Therefore, another purpose of the following numerical cal- 
culations is to see how far the guaranteed probability of 
detection (2-18) deviates from a probability of detection 
which has been determined on the basis of (2-19). 
One general question may be raised concerning our pro- 
cedure: As the variances of the measurement errors are as- 
sumed to be known, could one transform to the two independent 
random variables Y1 and Y2, and thus, avoid the complicated 
formulas (2-16)? In fact, such a scheme has been discussed 
recently by Bennet et al. [12]. The answer is that the safe- 
guards authority would like to perform the two tests con- 
cerning material balance and data verification separately and 
see whether or not one of these tests indicates a significant 
difference; this would provide an immediate idea as to the 
source of the errors, losses, or diversion Therefore, a 
transformation to quantities which have no 2r1ysical meaning 
is not of much help. 
3. Application to a Realistic Case 
3.1 Basic Data of the NFS Irradiated Fuel Processing 
Plant 
In the following we consider as an example The ~uclear 
Fuel Services (NFS) plant near Buffalo, N.Y. This plant repro- 
cesses irradiated fuel elements of reactors on the basis of 
the PUREX process. The numerical data are taken from Ref. 
[71. 
We shall consider the case of one inventory period. As it is 
assumed that there are two inventory periods per year, this 
means a time period of 6 months. The campaign data and 
the batch data are given in Table 1 for plutonium; this 
is the only important material in this context and will be 
considered exclusively in the following. 
3.2 Measurement Accuracies; Variance of the "Material 
Unaccounted For" 
- 
According to Section 2.1 the establishment of the mate- 
rial balance includes the establishment of the 
i) inital physical inventory Io; 
ii) book inventory B (Io + input - product - waste); 
iii) ending physical inventory I ~ .  
3,2,1 Physical Inventories 
We assume 
and assume further that the variation of these inventories 
is of the same order of magnitude: 
1 - 1 [kg] 5 I 1 + l[kg] . (3-lb) 
Of1 
If we assume, in addition, that the physical inventories are 
equally distributed random variables with a range given by 
(3-lb) , we obtain 
2 var IO = var I, = 0.333 [kg ] . (3-lc) 
3.2.2 Input 
One measurement of the plutonium content G1 of the j th j 
input batch consists of a 
i) volume determination vij [l] ; 
ii) drawing of a sample [g Pu/R]; 
iii) concentration measurement C of the sample. 
1 j 
Therefore, in the case of no data falsification the operator 
reports the data 
where 
V ' S  a r e  t h e  random and s y s t e m a t i c  e r r o r s  and where ev '  f and e l  
1 I 1  
of  t h e  volume d e t e r m i n a t i o n ;  e l I j  C ' r  and e l  are t h e  random and 
s y s t e m a t i c  e r r o r s  o f  t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  d e t e r m i n a t i o n ;  and 
do' ? i s  t h e  sampl ing  e r r o r  i n  t h e  o p e r a t o r ' s  sample.  1  # l  - 
The v a r i a n c e s  o f  t h e s e  e r r o r s  a r e  
v r r  = ,  v a r  e l  2 
v I r f l  
V I S  = ,  v a r  e . 
1 I l  v I s I 1  
v a r  eCfr = o 2 
! I  c I r f  1  
C I S  = o 2  v a r  e l  . 
I 3  C I  s 
v a r  d7 'S  = o 2 1 3  sf 1 
I f  one assumes t h a t  one  c a l i b r a t i o n  p e r  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d  i s  
performed b o t h  f o r  t h e  volume and f o r  t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  
measurement,  and i f  one  n e g l e c t s  e r r o r  t e r m s  of t h e  second 
o r d e r ,  t h e n  t h e  t o t a l  i n p u t  r e p o r t e d  by t h e  o p e r a t o r  i s  
g i v e n  by 
N1 
~ n p u t  = N~ E V ~  E C ~  + 1 [Ev l  (e7:7 + ecf  1 + dy : f )  + 
j = l  
v , r  
+ E C I  ( e l f  j + eyfs,] t j ( 3 - 4 )  
and t h e  v a r i a n c e  i s  
2 var [Input] = E v1 (N1 U 2 + N 1 * a  2 + N l e a  
c1r11 sf 1 + CI sf 1 
3.2.3 Waste 
The situation in the case of waste is exactly the same 
as in the case of input except that all the characteristics 
quantities have different values. Thus, for waste--character- 
ized by the index 3-- we have 
2 
var [Waste] = E v3 (N3 a 2 + N 3 * a  2 + N3 a 2 
cl r, 3 sf3 c,s13 1 + 
3.2.4 Product 
The situation in the case of the product is different, 
insofar as not the volume but the total weight of the batch 
is determined by taking the gross and the tare weight of the 
batch; thus, the systematic errors of these measurements are 
cancelled. Therefore, one has for the material content G 
21 
of the j th product batch. 
c = E C ~  + eCfr CI s Pu 
21 2,j + e2 + dy:~I kz mat 
V'S and e2 where e2 V't are the random errors of the gross and 
I j 
tare weights of the weighing procedure; eqfr and e;lS are 
I 3 
the random and systematic errors of the concentration mea- 
surement; and d;lC is the sampling error of the concentration 
I 3  
measurement. 
The variances of these errors are 
Vlt = :a 2 VtS = var e2 var e2 
tj I I v, 2 
ctr = var e2 
ctr12 .j 
var e;ts = a 
13 ~ 1 ~ 1 2  
var ditc = a 2 
13 st2 
Therefore, the variance of the total product during the refer- 
ence time is 
- 
var [product] = var 
j=l 
3.2.5 Material Unaccounted For 
According to Eq. (2-2) the Material Unaccounted For is 
defined as 
MUF: = I0 + Input - Product - Waste - I 1 (3-10) 
If the operator does not divert any material (null hypothesis 
H0), the expectation value of MUF is zero; in case of di- 
version of the amount MI the expectation value of MUF is M 
(see Eqs. (2-4)). The variance of MUF is, in both cases, 
given by 
v a r  (MUF) = : OMUF = 2var  I. + v a r  ( I n p u t )  + 
+ v a r  (Produc t )  + v a r  (Waste) 
(3-11) 
where t h e  s i n g l e  e x p r e s s i o n s  a r e  g iven  by Eqs. ( 3 - l c ,  5 ,  6 ,  
9)  
Numerical v a l u e s  f o r  a l l  v a r i a n c e s  ( r e s p .  r e l a t i v e  
s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n s )  a r e  l i s t e d  i n  Table  2. The r e s u l t s  of 
t h e  M a t e r i a l  Unaccounted For  a r e  g iven  i n  Table  3. 
3 .3  v e r i f i c a t i o n  Procedure  
I t  i s  assumed t h a t  t h e  i n s p e c t o r  obse rve s  a l l  of t h e  
measurements n ece s sa r y  f o r  t a k i n g  t h e  p h y s i c a l  i n v e n t o r y ,  
and t h a t  he must n o t  v e r i f y  t h e  volume and we igh t  de te rmi -  
n a t i o n s  o r  t h e  sampling p rocedures ,  as t h e y  a r e  au tomat ized  
and t h e r e f o r e ,  tamperproof.  I t  i s  f u r t h e r  assumed, t h a t  t h e  
i n s p e c t o r  v e r i f i e s  t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  on t h e  
b a s i s  o f  a random sampling scheme, and t h a t  bo th  t h e  o p e r a t o r  
and t h e  i n s p e c t o r  use  t h e  same measurement methods. 
I n  case t h e  o p e r a t o r  wants  t o  d i v e r t  m a t e r i a l  by means 
of  d a t a  f a l s i f i c a t i o n ,  he  p roceeds  a s  f o l l ows :  he  d i l u t e s  r l  
of h i s  samples  i n  o r d e r  t o  s i m u l a t e  a smaller amount o f  i n p u t .  
I n  t h i s  way he  g a i n s  m a t e r i a l  which he can  d i v e r t .  T he re fo r e ,  
i n s t e a d  of  (3-2c) w e  have 
c = Ec 1 - p; f o r  j = I f . - . , r  1 , j  1 
c C f r  + e ; r S  + d;:; 1 . j  = + e l I j  f o r  j = I r - . . , N 1  - r l  
The o p e r a t o r  r e p o r t s ,  however, c + p l ,  f o r  j = I , . . .  i j  , r l  i n  
o r d e r  t o  keep t h e  m a t e r i a l  ba lance .  
H e  proceeds  i n  t h e  same way f o r  t h e  p roduc t  and t h e  
was te ,  ex cep t  t h a t  i n  t h e s e  two c a s e s  he  c o n c e n t r a t e s  t h e  
samples. 
Remark: C l e a r l y ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  w i l l  be  t h e  same i f  t h e  
o p e r a t o r  does  n o t  d i l u t e  o r  c o n c e n t r a t e  samples ,  b u t  
s i m p l i f y  r e p o r t s  wrong d a t a .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  i f  cot '  i = 1 ,  2,  3 ,  j = 1 ,. . . , n i t  a r e  t h e  re- i , j t  
s u l t s  of t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  measurements r e p o r t e d  by t h e  
o p e r a t o r  and t h o s e  of t h e  i n s p e c t i o n  team, t h e n  t h e  D- 
s t a t i s t i c s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  eq.  (2-8) a r e  g i v e n  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
e x p r e s s i o n  : 
The r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  s p e c i a l  c h o i c e  of  s i g n s  was e x p l a i n e d  
above. 
The e x p e c t a t i o n  v a l u e s  of  D under  t h e  n u l l  and a l t e r n a -  
t i v e  h y p o t h e s i s  a r e  g i v e n  by 
C 
where p i s  t h e  amount by which t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of a  f a l -  i 
s i f i e d  b a t c h  of c l a s s  i i s  f a l s i f i e d .  The amount of  m a t e r i a l  
which can be  d i v e r t e d  t h i s  way i s  given  by 
where 
AS one can  see from Eqs. (3-15) and (3-141, M2 and E(D/M,) 
a r e  n o t  i d e n t i c a l .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  o p t i m i z a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  
s k e t c h e d  i n  Chap te r  2 must be  modi f i ed ;  i n s t e a d  of Eq. (2-13) 
w e  now have 
J 
Under t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  w e  have 
Ni 1 -  E Pi i E v i  i 
E ( D / H 1 )  = Ni 
M2 . 
1 -  E i  ' Pi  
i E vi 
The b a s i c  d a t a  f o r  t h e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  scheme a r e  c o l l e c t e d  i n  
Tab le  4a. Because o f  t h e  l a r g e  d i f f e r e n c e  of t h e  amounts 11; 
by which t h e  d a t a  have t o  be  f a l s i f i e d ,  p r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  o f  
t h e  e f f o r t  must go t o  t h e  p r o d u c t  s t r eam.  I t  does  n o t  mean, 
however, t h a t  t h e  i n p u t  and was te  s t r e a m  d a t a  must  n o t  be  
v e r i f i e d  a t  a l l .  The f o l l o w i n g  p rocedure  i s  proposed:  
For  s m a l l  amounts of e f f o r t ,  o n l y  one b a t c h  i s  v e r i f i e d  
i n  t h e  i n p u t  and one i n  t h e  was te  s t r e a m ;  t h e  rest goes  t o  
t h e  p r o d u c t  stream. i f  t h e r e  i s  more e f f o r t  a v a i l a b l e  t h a n  
f o r  t h e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  a l l  p r o d u c t  b a t c h e s ,  t h e n  t h e  remain- 
i n g  e f f o r t  must be  d i s t r i b u t e d  between i n p u t  and w a s t e  ac-  
c o r d i n g  t o  formula  (3-1 7 )  . 
The o p t i m a l  sample s i z e s  n! a r e  g iven  i n  Tab le  4c a s  a  
f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  t o t a l  e f f o r t  C. The o p t i m a l  numbers o f  f a l -  
s i f i e d  b a t c h e s  r: a r e  g iv en  i n  Table  4c a s  a  f u n c t i o n  of  t h e  
t o t a l  amount M 2  assumed t o  be d i v e r t e d .  The s t a n d a r d  d e v i a -  
t i o n s  of t h e  D - s t a t i s t i c s  under t h e  n u l l  and t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
hypotheses  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  e f f o r t  C and t h e  amount M2 
assumed t o  be d i v e r t e d  a r e  g iven  i n  Table  5.  
3 .4 Determinat ion o f  t h e  C o r r e l a t i o n  Between Data 
V e r i f i c a t i o n  and M a t e r i a l  Balance Es t a b l i s hm e n t  
I t  was p r e v i o u s l y  mentioned,  t h e  random v a r i a b l e s  MUF 
and D a r e  s t o c h a s t i c a l l y  dependent  because  t h e  d a t a  o f  t h e  
o p e r a t o r  a r e  used bo th  f o r  d a t a  v e r i f i c a t i o n  and f o r  m a t e r i a l  
ba l ance  e s t a b l i s h m e n t .  I n  c a s e  of  t h e  n u l l  hypo the s i s  H o ,  w e  
have : 
where f  and d1 a r e  t h e  e r r o r s  o f  t h e  i n s p e c t o r  cor responding  
t o  t h o s e  of t h e  o p e r a t o r .  
I f  w e  omi t  t h e  v an i sh ing  terms w e  o b t a i n  
cov (MUF, D/HO)  = 
T h i s  means t h a t  MUF ana  D a r e  n e g a t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d .  
From E q .  (3-20) w e  o b t a i n  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  
f o r  t h e  n u l l  h y p o t h e s i s  Ho: 
cov ( M U F , D / H ~ )  
. = 
P ~ < o  J v a r  (MUF) Jvar  (D /HO)  
I n  c a s e  of  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  hypo the s i s  H I  ( d i v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  
amounts M1 and M2 by means of t h e  two s t r a t e g i e s )  w e  have,  
i n s t e a d  of  E q .  (3 -17) ,  
where 
Here, E (MUF, D )  i s  g i v e n  by Eqs. (3-4) e t c . ,  (3-12) e t c . ,  
and (3-19) by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x p r e s s i o n :  
where h v r  v  = 1.  2. 3  a r e  t h e  numbers of b a t c h  d a t a  f a l s i f i e d  
by t h e  o p e r a t o r  and c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  samples o f  t h e  inspec-  
t i o n  team. 
With 
and because  of t h e  independence of  t h e  e ,  d ,  f  on one hand 
and kv on t h e  o t h e r  hand, w e  o b t a i n  
cov (MUF, D/H1 ) = COV (MUF, D/HO)  (3-24) 
which a l s o  means t h a t  i n  t h i s  c a s e  w e  have p < 0. However, 
because  of  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  of t h e  v a r i a n c e  of  t h e  D - s t a t i s t i c s  
i n  c a s e  of H o  and H1 w e  have,  i n s t e a d  o f  ( 3 -21 ) )  
cov (MUF D/HO 
v a r  (D/H1)  
The c o r r e l a t i o n s  p and pH a s  a  f u n c t i o n  of  t h e  e f f o r t  C Ho 1 
and amount M of d i v e r t e d  m a t e r i a l  a r e  g iven  i n  Tab le  6. 
3.5 O v e r a l l  P r o b a b i l i t v  of  De t ec t i on  
I n  F i g u r e  3 ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  of  t h e  numerica l  c a l c u l a t i o n s  
f o r  t h e  o v e r a l l  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  d e t e c t i o n  1 - B acco rd ing  t o  
Eqs. (2-16b) and (2-16a) a r e  p r e s e n t e d  f o r  one i n v e n t o r y  
p e r i o d  ( i .e .  6 months) f o r  t h e  pa ramete r s  M = M I  + M2 = 10kg Put  
a  = 0.05, a  = a 2 ,  and f o r  va ry ing  M1 ( r e s p .  M 2 )  and e f f o r t  1 
C .  The cor responding  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of  d e t e c t i o n  f o r  p = 0 
which have been c a l c u l a t e d  acco rd ing  t o  (2-17b and (2-17a) 
a r e  a lmos t  t h e  same a s  t h o s e  f o r  p < 0; t h i s  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s -  
i n g  because  f o r  P < 0,  t h e  f a l s e  a l a rm  r e l a t i o n  Eq. (2-16a) 
i s  p r a c t i c a l l y  t h e  same a s  t h a t  f o r  p = 0,  i .e .  Eq. (2-17a).  
A s  can b e  checked numer i ca l l y ,  t h e  minimum o f  t h e  prob- 
a b i l i t y  of d e t e c t i o n  i s  given  approximate ly  f o r  t h o s e  v a l u e s  
o f  M1 and M2 f o r  which t h e  fo l l owing  r e l a t i o n  h o l d s .  
0 MUF 0 D/H1 
The r e l a t i o n  i s  i n t u i t i v e  because  of  t h e  symmetry of  t h e  f o r -  
mulas,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  p = 0.  Accordingly ,  t h e  maximum of  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  of d e t e c t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  i n s p e c t o r ' s  
s t r a t e g i e s  ( f o r  an o p t i m a l  o p e r a t o r ' s  s t r a t e g y )  i s  approxi -  
ma te ly  g i v e n  f o r  a l  = a 2 .  Th i s  can be  s e e n  i n  F i g u r e s  4 and 5  
where t h e  v a l u e s  of  a l  and a  a r e  d i f f e r e n t .  2  
A t  f i r s t  s i g h t  it seems s t r a n g e  t h a t  f o r  a  c e r t a i n  
range  of  t h e  M1 ( r e s p .  M 2 )  v a l u e s ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  d e t e c -  
t i o n  d e c r e a s e s  with,  i n c r e a s i n g  e f f o r t  C.  However, t h e  exp la -  
n a t i o n  i s  given  e a s i l y .  A s  shown i n  Table  5 ,  t h e  v a r i a n c e  
var(D/M1) d e c r e a s e s  monotonously w i t h  i n c r e a s i n g  e f f o r t  C ,  
which i s  i n t u i t i v e .  T h i s  means t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  
d e t e c t i o n  
i n c r e a s e s  w i t h  i n c r e a s i n g  e f f o r t  i f  t h e  argument o f  t h e  $ 
f u n c t i o n  i s  p o s i t i v e ,  and d e c r e a s e s  i f  t h e  argument i s  
n e g a t i v e .  A s  can be s e e n  from t h e  numer ica l  d a t a ,  t h e  change 
i n  d i r e c t i o n  of  e f f o r t  C ' s  i n f l u e n c e  i s  given  a t  t h a t  p l a c e  
where t h e  argument of  t h e  $ - func t ion  changes i t s  s i g n .  
The numer ica l  c a l c u l a t i o n s  may be  summarized by s t a t i n g  
t h a t  t h e  o v e r a l l  g u a r a n t e e d  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  d e t e c t i o n  f o r  a  
g iven  e f f o r t  C ,  and a  t o t a l  amount M of m a t e r i a l  t o  b e  d i v e r t e d  
f o r  one  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d  i s  s imply  c a l c u l a t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
fo rmulas  (2-17b) and (2-17a)  f o r  a l  = a 2 ;  M amd M2 a r e  1  
chosen a c c o r d i n g  t o  (3-26) . 
4.  Conclus ion  
The purpose  of t h i s  p a p e r  was t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  
of t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  n u c l e a r  m a t e r i a l  s a f e g u a r d s  sys tem which 
i s  based on m a t e r i a l  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  and i t s  v e r i f i c a t i o n  a t  
t h e  hand of  a  r e a l i s t i c  numer ica l  example. The problem was 
compl ica ted  because  t h e  two s t a t i s t i c s  on which t h e  i n s p e c t o r ' s  
s ta tements  a r e  based a r e  s t o c h a s t i c a l l y  dependent. I t  was 
shown t h a t  t h i s  depencence may be neg lec ted  i n  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  
s i t u a t i o n .  Therefore ,  r a t h e r  s imple  formulas may be used f o r  
t h e  de te rmina t ion  of t h e  system e f f i c i e n c y ,  i . e .  t h e  t o t a l  
guaranteed p r o b a b i l i t y  of d e t e c t i o n .  
A l l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  were based on t h e  case  of one mate- 
r i a l  balance a r e a  which was one p l a n t .  I f  one cons ide r s  
more than  one m a t e r i a l  balance a r e a ,  then new c o r r e l a t i o n s  
a r i s e ;  i n  some c a s e s ,  t h e s e  may be important  f o r  t h e  reduc- 
t i o n  of i n s p e c t i o n  e f f o r t  i s  kept  cons t an t .  An example i s  
t h e  sh ippe r - r ece ive r - co r r e l a t i ons  between two d i f f e r e n t  
nuc l ea r  p l a n t s ;  they  may be used e i t h e r  t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  
measurements a t  bo th  s i t e s  by s imple  s e a l i n g  measures, o r  a s  
an a d d i t i o n a l  check .if bo th  measurements a r e  kep t .  Therefore ,  
t h e  cons ide ra t ion  of a  nuc l ea r  f u e l  c y c l e  a s  a  whole which 
inc ludes  many m a t e r i a l  balance a r e a s ,  r a i s e s  q u e s t i o n s  which 
go beyond t h e  scope of t h i s  work. 
Table 1. NFS campaign and batch data for the reference 
time T (6 months) for the plutonium throughput. 
Pu throughput/T [kg] 
Liquid waste [ %  of inputl 
Hull losses [ %  of inputl 
Number of campaigns/~ 
Number of working days/T 
Input 
Input/campaign [kg] 
Number of batches/campaign 
Batch volume [l] 
Pu content/batch [kg] 
Batch-to-batch variation [%I 
Product 
Number of batches/campaign 
Weight of batch [kg] 
Pu content/batch [kg] 
Batch-to-batch variation [ P I  
Liquid Waste 
Number of batches/campaign 
Batch volume [I] 
Pu content/batch [kg] 
Batch-to-batch variation [%I 
Table 2. Pu measurement system for the NFS plant 
(source: [7l). 
Class Measurement 
Standard 
deviation Effort per 
per single single 
measurement measurement 
Man- 
hours Cost 
% % [hl [US$] 
Input 
Volume determination 
.35 .1 .7 - (diptube system) 
Sampling 1 - 1.5 - 
Concentration deter- 
mination (isotopic .6  . 3  - 400 
dilution) 
Weighing 
Sampling .5 - 2.25 - 
Product 
Concentration deter- 
mination (amperomet- 
.4 . 3  ric titration and 
isotopic analysis) 
Liquid 
Waste 
Volume determination 
(level indicator) 5 
Sampling 50 - .5 - 
Concentration deter- 
mination (TTA extrac- 15 10 2 40 
tion and counting) 
Physical 
Inventory Washout 
Table 3. Variance of the material unaccounted for (MUF) 
for one inventory period. 
Variance [kg1 Standard deviation [kg] 
Input 8.564 1) 
Product 6.837 2) 
Waste 0.958 3) 
Inventory 0.333 4) 
MUF 17.026 5) 4.126 
1) E q .  (3-5) 
2) E q .  (3-9) 
3) E q .  (3-6) 
4) E q .  (3-lc) 
5) E q .  (3-11) 
T a b l e  4a.  I n p u t  d a t a  f o r  t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  measurement 
v e r i f i c a t i o n .  
Pu con- E f f o r t  Ei Amount p i  
T o t a l  num- Batch  t e n t  p e r  ( U S $ )  P e r  [kg1 P e r  
C l a s s  b e r  o f  s i z e  b a t c h  v e r i f i c a -  b a t c h  t o  b e  
i b a t c h e s  Ni Evi [kg ]  t i o n  d i v e r t e d  
I n p u t  1 
Prod- 
u c t  2  
Waste 3  
T a b l e  4b. Op t ima l  sample  s i z e s  o f  t h e  i n s p e c t o r  ( 1 ) :  Here, t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  (3-23a)  gave  n? > Ni;  t h e r e f o r e  i n  t h i s  
1 
c l a s s  np = Ni was t a k e n  and t h e  r e m a i n i n g  e f f o r t  
C - E . n  was d i s t r i b u t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  (2 -23a ) .  
1 i 
c [ %  o f  
max e f f o r t ]  100 80 60 50 30 20 10 5 1 
T a b l e  4 c .  Opt imal  sample  s i z e s  o f  t h e  o p e r a t o r .  
Amount M 
t o  b e  
d i v e r t e d  
[kg 1 .1 . 5  1 2  3  4 5 6  7 8  9 10  
Table  5. S tandard  d e v i a t i o n s  under t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  h y p o t h e s i s  (M > 0)  and hr D/H, D / H ~  
under  t h e  n u l l  h y p o t h e s i s  ( M  = 0)  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  amount M [kg]  t o  be d i v e r t e d  
and i n s p e c t i o n  e f f o r t  C [ X  o f  maximun e f f o r t ] .  
T a b l e  6.  C o r r e l a t i o n  g under  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  h y p o t h e s i s  (M > 0 )  and under  
t h e  n u l l  h y p o t h e s i s  (M = 0 )  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  of  amount ~ [ k g ]  t o  
b e  d i v e r t e d ,  and i n s p e c t i o n  e f f o r t  c [X of  maximum e f f o r t ] .  

F I G . 2 :  MUTUAL DEPENDENCE OF THE  SINGLE TEST FALSE 
ALARM PROBABILITIES C f l  AND d2 WITH CORRELATION p 
AS PARAMETER FOR TOTAL FALSE ALARM PROBABILITY 
Cr = 0.05 
FIG. 3 : TOTAL PROBABILITY OF DETECTION AS FUNCTION OF AMOUNT MI OF 
MATERIAL DIVERTED, WITH EFFORT C [ ' lo  OF MAXIMUM EFFORT ] AS PARAMETER , 
AND MI + M2 = 10 [ kg 1, dl = d 2 ,  d = 0.05.  DASHED LINES: 9 = 0 .  FOR 
C =lo, 5,1 DASHED AND CONTINUOUS LINES COINCIDE. 

z t- m- 
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Annex 
Discussion of the False Alarm Eauation 
A.l  orm mu la ti on of the Problem 
According to (2-15a), the false alarm equation is given by 
the following expression: 
I J I dtl J I 1 - a  = dt2 exp 2.rrJG-7 -w -w 
where U is the inverse of the normal distribution function @ 
-1 
u(x) = 4 (x) ; $(x) = - jx exp ($1 dt . (A-2) rn 
-w 
As one can see immediately, Eq. (A-1) reduces to the following 
form for p = 0: 
which is well known in the field of multivariate statistical 
inference (see, e.g. [A-11 ) . Therefore, (A-1) may be consid- 
ered as a generalization of (A-3) for the case of stochas- 
tically dependent random variables. 
In the following, we will discuss the analytic properties 
of the false alarm equation, as well as graphical and numerical 
methods for the tabulation of the relation between al and a2 
for given values of the parameters a and p .  
A.2 Bonferroni's Inequality 
Let X and Y be Gaussian distributed random variables with 
expectation values 0 and variances 1. Then (A-1) is equiva- 
lent to the following form: 
Now, Bonferroni's inequality [A-11 generally states 
pr {AUB) = pr {A) + pr {B) - pr {A n B)< pr {A) + pr {B) 
- 
(A-4) 
or, with the duality theorem 
pr {AUB) = pr {An El = 1 - pr { A  n B) - < pr {A) + pr {B) . 
- 
Therefore, with A + C, B + 6 ,  we obtain 
pr {C n D) > pr {c) + pr {D) - 1 . 
Application to Eq. (A-4) gives with Eqs. (A-2) 
for any value of p. (The complementary inequality which can 
be derived from (A-4 ) , 
is without practical application in this text.) 
A.3 The Bivariate Normal Distribution Function 
The random variables X and Y are said to be distributed 
as a bivariate normal distribution with means and variances 
(0,O) and (1,l) and correlation p ,  if the joint probability 
that X is less than or equal to h and Y is less than or equal 
to k is given by 
k 
pr {X - < h,Y < k) = ih 6s j dt exp [- p2 - 2pst + t 
2 7 4 7  -03 -33 2 (1 - p2) ' I
The following properties are important for the discussion of 
(A-1) : 
1 - @ (h) , for k < h L(h,k,l) = - 
1 - $I (k) , for k > h 
- 
L(h,k,-1) = , f o r h + k > O  
1 - h - $ I  , for h + k - < 0 
With the help of (A-61, (A-1) can be expressed in the following 
way 
Or, if we use the relation 
we obtain 
A.4 Extreme Values for the False Alarm Equation 
For a2 = 0 we obtain, using lim - 
'1-a2 
m, from Eq. (A-1) 
a,+O 
?-a, 
1 - a  = lim 1 
'i +a 4% dt 1 $1 
ul-a,, -00 &m 
F o r  al = 0 ,  we o b t a i n  t h e  s a m e  r e s u l t  f o r  r e a s o n s  o f  s y m m e t r y ,  
i . e .  
("1 f o r  a2 = 0  
a = \ a 2  I f o r  al = o 
F o r  p = 1 w e  o b t a i n ,  f r o m  (A-8) a n d  ( A - l o ) ,  
1 -  @ ( U a  - 
1 - a = L(Ua ,Ua , I )  = 1 fo r  Ua 2  ' U a l  . 
1 2  1 - @ ( U a  ) , fo r  Ua - > Ua 
2  2  1 
T h e r e f o r e ,  
a < a  2 -  1 f o r  p = 1, a n d .  
a 2  a > a  2 -  1 
F o r  p = -1 w e  o b t a i n ,  f r o m  (A-9 ( a n d  (A-10)  , 
> 0  , f o r  Ua + U a  -
1 -  a =  L ( U  ,Ua - 1  = 1 2  
2  < 0  
- @ ( U a  , f o r  Ua + U a  - 
2  1 2 
A s  t h e  case 
is not interesting here, we have 
a = a  + a  for p =-1 and al + a2 5 1 (A-13) 1 2 ' 
which is the limiting case in Bonferroni's Equation (A-5). 
A.4 Monotony of the Function al(p) for a = a2 and a given 1- 
In this section we show that for al = a2 and a given,the 
function al(p) as defined implicitly by (A-l), is monotonously 
increasing for -1 - < p - < 1. 
We start by performing the second integration in (A-1) 
which immediately gives 
For al = a2, we obtain the implicit representation of the 
function a (p) we are interested in: 1 
We want to show that the derivative - does 2ot change its 
d~ 
sign. As Ul-a = -u 
a 
, and furthermore, 
1 1 
1 
we may simply consider the derivative -because - does 
not change its sign. dp dal 
P a r t i a l  d e r i v a t i o n  of (A-15) g i v e s  
I n  t h e  fo l lowing  we simply w r i t e  a  i n s t e a d  of  a l .  We then  
o b t a i n  wi th  t h e  fo l lowing  r e l a t i o n  
from (A-17) 
o = - -  exp + 
"5 
With 
w e  o b t a i n  
O r ,  by u s e  o f  
la d z *  z  e x p  (- $1- - e x p  - $1 , 
-00 
A s  t h e  t e r m  on t h e  r i g h t  hand s i d e  o f  (A-18) ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  
dUa dU a  f a c t o r  o f  -dp a r e  g r e a t e r  t h a n  z e r o ,  w e  h a v e  shown t h a t  -d~  
d a  
and  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  - i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  z e r o  o f  -1 < p < 1. dp - - 
W e  w i l l  show, i n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h a t  t h e  f u n c t i o n  a ( p )  h a s  n o  
i n f l e c t i o n  p o i n t s .  F o r  t h i s  pu rpose  it i s  a g a i n  s u f f i c i e n t  
d2Un 
t o  c o n s i d e r  - a s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  (A-16) , w e  h a v e  
dp2  
From (A-18) w e  g e t  
which gives 
The right hand side is greater than zero if and only if 
or equivalently, if and only if 
For 1 + 2U < 0, or a < 0.31, this is true for all P with a 
As can be seen easily, for Ua < -1 (or a < 0.16), the inequality 
(A-10) is fulfilled for any p with -1 - < p - < 1. 
A.5 Monotony of the Function a2k1) for given a and P 
da, L 
In order to determine the derivative -, for given a and 
dal 
p of the function a2(a1), which is given implicitly by (A-l), 
we start again from (A-14). 
P a r t i a l  d e r i v a t i o n  g i v e s  
uL 
ua ' ' - "".) ;:; 
0 = exp (- $)-$( .- 
A-,2 
dUa2 
T h e r e f o r e  w e  o b t a i n  t h e  r e s u l t  - < 0 ,  and w i t h  
da 1 
t h a t  
The q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s  whether  o r  n o t  t h e  f u n c t i o n  ct2(al) h a s  
i n f l e c t i o n  p o i n t s .  I n  o r d e r  t o  a n a l y z e  t h i s  w e  w r i t e  (A-21) 
i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  form 
P -  
O = exp 
Derivat ion a f t e r  a l  g ives  
u2 
0 = exp + ex. (- q) 
h-p 
' P  - u 2 
+ exp + exp (- >) 
da 
u* 
+ exp (- +) exp (- k a l * p - ~ a J ) .  2 1 t a d u a l  - - - d"a2) -  
2 ( 1 - P  ) A-p2 dal dal 
L A s  t h e  f a c t o r  of 7 i s  g r e a t e r  than  ze ro ,  we o b t a i n  
dal 
sgn (d2ai)= da 1 exp ( " t ~ [ 4 [ a 2 e p - u a $ . u a 2 .  - - ~7 
da2 2 . t ~ J  da 1 
dUa 
+ exp 1 . u  . -
al dal 
1 + = exp 
J2 .rr 
2 
a2  f o r  t h e  s i g n  of -2 -  
da 1 
For a 1 ' a2 < 0.5, we obtain 
dUa dUa da2 da2 
- -  
2 1 p . . -  2 
dUa 
> O  and - * -  - 0 ' -  1 (0 . 
dal da2 dal da2 dal da 1 
This is true for p > 0. It cannot be shown in this way that the 
2 
"2 sign of -- 2 does not change for p 0. 
da!. 
A.6 Graphical Representation of the False Alarm Equation 
In the following, we want to represent Equation (A-1) 
graphically: we plot al as a function of a2 with p as a 
garameter for a given value of a. For p = -1, 0,l we already 
know the analytical form (Eqs. (A-13, 17 and 3)); we also 
know the form for al = 0 and a2 = 0 for arbitrary 
values of P. Bonferroni's inequality (A-5) and the conditions 
(which follow from (A-ll) and from symmetry considerations) 
limit the possible values in the (al - a2) plane. 
In the following, three different methods for the tabu- 
lation of the false alarm equation are discussed 
i) Graphical method; 
ii) Simulation method; 
iii) Use of approximate formulas for L (hfkf p) . 
A.6.1 Graphical Method 
In Ref. [A-21, the function 
(ph - k) sgn h 
h2 - 2hkp + k 2 
is tabulated for -1 < - p < - 1 and 0 < - h < - 2.5. With the help 
of the relation 
function (A-24) can be tabulated also for negative values of 
h. In addition, we have 
(ph - h) sgn k 
L(hlk1p) = L 
- 2hkp + k 
- t i  I otherwise 
Therefore, the false alarm equation can be represented in the 
following form: 
if U1 - a 1 > 1 > 0 and a + a2 - ul-ci - 1 2 
- 
otherwise 
This relation has been used to tabulate al as a function of 
with p and ci as parameters on the basis of the graphical 
representation of the function (A-24) in Ref. [A-21. 
AS t h e  accuracy of t h e  ( A - 2 4 )  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  n o t  
b e t t e r  than 0 . 0 1 ,  it has no t  been p o s s i b l e  t o  o b t a i n  a  s a t i s -  
f y i n g  accuracy f o r  va lues  of (a1,a2) approaching ( 0 , a )  and 
(a,O) t h e r e f o r e ,  d i f f e r e n t  methods had t o  be used i n  t hese  
c r i t i c a l  reg ions .  
A . 6 . 2  Simulat ion Method 
I n  o r d e r  t o  t a b u l a t e  Eq. (A-1) with t h e  h e l p  of a  simu- 
l a t i o n  method, t h e  fol lowing procedure i s  used: Let  A ,  B ,  and 
C be normally d i s t r i b u t e d  random v a r i a b l e s ,  wi th  
E A = E B = E C = O  , v a r A = a  2 2 var  B = aB , var  C = u 2 A C 
Then we can t a b u l a t e  ( A - 1 )  by means of t h e  fol lowing form: 
prob A + B  < Ul-a , + A + C  < Ul-& 
- - 
1 2 
where t h e  va r i ances  a r e  determined i n  such a  way t h a t  t h e  
va r i ances  of  A + B and ?A + C a r e  1: 
and where t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  t a k e s  t h e  va lue  f p :  
- 
L 
c o r  ( A + B , + A + C )  = - + u A = p  . 
s2 A B A C  K-2
The disadvantage of t h i s  method i s  t h a t  it provides  no d i r e c t  
method of c a l c u l a t i o n  of al  a s  a  func t ion  of a 2  f o r  g iven 
va lues  of a  and p ;  one has  t o  f i x  a  1, O 2 '  and p and determine 
a ,  which means t h a t  one must i t e r a t e  u n t i l  one has  reached 
t h e  prev ious ly  chosen va lue  of a  chosen below. 
A.6.3 U s e  o f  Approximate Formulas f o r  L ( h , k , p )  
The method which h a s  proven m o s t  s u c c e s s f u l  f o r  t h e  
numer ica l  c a l c u l a t i o n s  u s e s  approximate  fo rmulas  f o r  t h e  
b i v a r i a t e  normal d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  g i v e n  by Owen [A-31.  
L e t  u s  d e f i n e  
and f u r t h e r m o r e ,  
Then w e  have a c c o r d i n g  t o  Owen 
i i f  h k > O  o r  i f  hk = 0 , h o r  k - > 0 B ( h t k r p )  = . (A-28) 1 - - 2 \ 
i f  h k < O  o r  i f  hk = 0 , h o r  k < 0 
Fur thermore ,  w e  have 
where 
converge  r a p i d l y  f o r  s m a l l  v a l u e s  o f  a  and h .  
On t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e s e  f o r m u l a s ,  t h e  f a l s e  a l a r m  r e l a t i o n  
( A - 1 )  h a s  been de te rmined  n u m e r i c a l l y  f o r  f i x e d  v a l u e s  o f  M. 
I n  F i g u r e  1 ( i n  t h e  main p a r t  o f  t h i s  p a p e r )  , f o r  a  = a 2 ,  1 
t h e  v a l u e s  o f  a l  as a f u n c t i o n  o f  p have been r e p r e s e n t e d  f o r  
d i f f e r e n t  v a l u e s  of  a .  A s  can  be s e e n  d i r e c t l y ,  t h e  v a l u e  o f  
p i s  p r a c t i c a l l y  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  t h e  v a l u e  of  a f o r  p < 0 .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  f o r  p < 0  (A-3) i s  f a v o r a b l e  i n s t e a d  o f  (A-1) , 
I n  F i g u r e  2,  f o r  a f i x e d  v a l u e  o f  a  = 0 . 0 5 ,  t h e  v a l u e s  
o f  a1 as a f u n c t i o n  of  a 2  w i t h  p as a  pa ramete r  have been 
r e p r e s e n t e d .  Again,  f o r  p < 0 ,  (A-3) i s  f a v o r a b l e  i n s t e a d  
o f  ( A - 1 )  . 
A.7 F a l s e  A l a r m  Equa t ion  f o r  Symmetric T e s t s  
A l l  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  paper  have been based  on 
one- s ided  t e s t s .  For  comple teness  w e  g i v e  t h e  f a l s e  
alarm e q u a t i o n  f o r  symmetric  tes ts ,  i . e .  f o r  tes ts  where t h e  
n u l l  h y p o t h e s i s  i s  g i v e n  by 
< EMUF - < p 2  
A s  can be s e e n  e a s i l y ,  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  f a l s e  a l a r m  e q u a t i o n  
is  g i v e n  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  formula :  
Without going i n t o  a  thorough d i s c u s s i o n  of t h i s  formula,  it 
should be s t a t e d  on ly  t h a t  it i s  i n v a r i a n t  t o  t h e  
change of t h e  s i g n  of P .  So f o r  al  = a 2  we o b t a i n  
a  = a * = a  1 f o r  p = + l  . - 
we l o s e  t h e  n i c e  proper ty  of t h e  one-sided t e s t  t h a t  f o r  
p < 0 ,  t h e  f a l s e  alarm r e l a t i o n  i s  p r a c t i c a l l y  .independent of 
t h e  value of a .  
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